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Résumé / Abstract 
Nous étudions la concurrence entre deux marchés boursiers développés, ceux du Canada et des 
États-Unis. Le développement des Bourses repose en grande partie sur leur capacité à attirer et 
retenir les inscriptions et les transactions. Le marché américain attire un nombre important de 
sociétés canadiennes, et capture une proportion croissante des échanges de titres de ces sociétés. 
Ce glissement des transactions représente un défi important pour le Canada dont les efforts pour 
contrer cette évolution semblent avoir eu des effets limités. Nous analysons les implications de 
cette situation en ce qui concerne la région Asie-Pacifique, où une concurrence importante existe 
entre les divers centres financiers en émergence.  
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We analyze the competition between two developed stock exchanges. Their development rests 
mainly on their capacity to attract securities and trades. The U.S. market is attracting a growing 
number of Canadian companies, and is capturing a growing portion of their traded value. This 
slide of trading toward the U.S. market is a huge challenge for Canadian policy makers, while 
the efforts to compete with the U.S. market seem to be having only limited effects. We analyze the 
implications of this situation for policy makers in Asia-Pacific, where several markets and 
financial centers are attempting to emerge. 
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COMPETITION AND SURVIVAL OF SECURITIES MARKETS: LESSONS FROM CANADA 
 
From 1990 to 1999, Cybo-Ottone et al. (2000) list about 100 consolidation deals covering stock 
exchanges in both the European Union (E.U.) and the United States (U.S.). The recent merge of 
NYSE and Euronext (April 04, 2007) illustrates the rapid move toward a worldwide integration 
of stock exchanges. Several authors view this evolution as inevitable. According to Coffee 
(2002), the number of securities exchanges in the world will likely shrink radically because of 
globalization and technology. DiNoia (2001) argues that in theory, competition among securities 
exchanges will ultimately result in a single market, except when exchanges negotiate alliances 
that convert them into cooperative networks. He posits that the consolidation of the European 
exchanges may produce a welfare-efficient outcome and that integrated markets mean that the 
welfare of national firms and intermediaries does not depend on their national exchange. Steil 
(2002) foresees the integration of the U.S. and the E.U. securities markets through mutual 
agreement. He argues that this initiative would reduce trading costs, increase investment returns, 
lower the cost of capital and stimulate economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic. Several 
international financial centers (IFC), in which efficient and strong stock exchanges are major 
components, compete in the Asia-Pacific area (Laurenceson and Tang, 2005). Wang (2000: 45) 
proposes that attracting foreign capital is the key measure for Singapore to become a major IFC: 
“the most effective measure to accelerate Singapore’s effort in becoming a regional financial 
center is to attract more foreign funds and regional companies for listing on the Stock Exchange 
of Singapore.” Our paper focuses on this dimension of the competition between stock exchanges. 
  In this context of increasing competition, the survival of small securities markets can be 
considered imperiled. Indeed, it is not necessary for all countries to have full-fledged securities 
markets for economic development, when capital markets are open and accessible internationally. 
However, the disappearance of the national markets has several negative implications. In Canada, 
Boisvert and Gaa (2001) note that such an event would have major consequences in terms of 
public policy and economic activity. Marano (2000) expresses her concern about the Italian 
market as follows:  “there is evidence that financial activity permits higher economic growth. The 
worry is that, if national financial centers disappear, local firms and households might end up 
having more, rather than less, difficulties in financing”. The concerns about the integration of the   3
main exchanges are threefold: 1) the stock exchange is generally predominant within financial 
centers, which generate strong economic activity based on highly skilled people; 2) the 
development effects of strong national stock markets is well documented and 3) the integrated 
large stock market can easily address the financing needs of large and international companies, 
but we do not know if they are able (or interested) to meet the needs of small firms, which 
generate smaller transaction volumes and fees (Ferrarini, 2002). Israeli authorities have 
implemented regulatory programs aimed at luring back home Israeli companies listed only on 
U.S. stock markets (Licht, 2001).  Wang (2000) reports that the Singapore government 
implemented many reforms in the past two decades to make Singapore a major IFC. In the same 
vein, Laurenceson and Tang (2005: 163) report that “Shanghai’s political leadership has set 10 to 
20 years as a timeframe for achieving IFC status”. The authors recall that established IFCs can 
decline due to competition from new challengers: Shanghai was the leading IFC in Asia in 1949, 
but nowadays Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore are the major IFCs competing in this region. 
Indeed, the preservation of a national securities market is a concern for several countries, and it is 
worth examining how realistic this preservation is. 
A great deal of attention has been devoted to the requisite conditions for a sound stock 
market to emerge (Levine et al., 2000). Several studies attempt to explain the migration of stocks 
from less developed toward more established financial centers (Claessens et al., 2002; Levine and 
Schmukler, 2007). However, little is known about the competition between stock markets that 
share similar characteristics in terms of rules of law, accounting standards, contract realization 
and level of corruption. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of a small albeit well-developed 
market, which competes with the U.S. market for trades and listings. Our paper focuses on the 
cross-listing decisions and consequences on firms in both countries, because, according to Coffee 
(2002:14): “by far, the principal mechanism that produces competition among market centers has 
been the issuer decision to cross-list its securities on a foreign exchange”. We extend previous 
work by analyzing a case where the smaller market decides to compete to remain in operation 
while reducing the advantage of the larger market. To estimate the effects of cross-listing on 
trade activity, we follow trading for 17 years (1990-2006). Previous studies tend to analyze a 
limited period of time, using cross-sectional regression or pooled data regression (Pagano et al., 
2001). Alternately, research has investigated the short-term effects of cross-listing on prices, 
volumes and turnover. In addition, we analyze two noteworthy dimensions to understand the   4
competition between the exchanges. First, we consider the total number of companies that list 
abroad, including the reasons they disappear from the official list of cross-listed stocks. 548 
Canadian companies have cross-listed in the U.S. since the beginning of 1990, but more than 355 
disappeared from the official lists. We also analyze the long-run changes in the distribution of 
trades between the two markets.  
The analysis of the Canadian case is of interest for the Asia-Pacific situation for several 
reasons. First, the Canadian market is, by far, the market that is most closely linked to the U.S. 
market. The interlisting of Canadian corporations has been facilitated by the implementation of 
the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS), which allows Canadian corporations to list 
their stocks in the U.S. under less rigorous criteria than those that apply to other non-American 
corporations. As mentioned by de Brouwer (2003), similar albeit limited actions have been 
implemented between several markets, such as Australia and Singapore and Japan and Singapore. 
This author strongly recommends such initiatives intended to link stock exchanges and promote 
integration in the region. The integration of the Canadian and U.S. exchanges in the past twenty 
years thus parallels the situation prevailing between several European markets, and the situation 
that could prevail in the Asian Pacific area if the integration efforts are completed. Canadian 
firms are the single largest group of foreign firms listed on U.S. securities exchanges, with 216 
(193) firms cross-listed in 2000 (2006). Opinions about the trends within the Canadian securities 
market are strongly opposed. Several authors hold a relatively optimistic view. Boisvert and Gaa 
(2002: 15) mention that “in Canada, the number of shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange has 
doubled in the last five years, while the dollar value of trading has increased three-fold”. 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) place Canada among countries that saw the highest increases in 
stock exchange listings from 1981 to 1998, far ahead of the U.S., Japan and the United Kingdom. 
Freedman and Engert (2003:13) of the Bank of Canada, conclude that “data do not provide much 
support for the view that domestic capital markets have been abandoned by Canadian firms or 
hollowed out in recent years”. By contrast, Reguly (1999) argues that the Toronto stock exchange 
(TSX) is a clear example of the hollowing out of corporate Canada. He calls the TSX “the 
Incredible Vanishing Exchange,” and notes that the liquidity of the TSX is evaporating. Reguly 
maintains that the TSX is powerless to stop companies from marching across the border. In a 
second paper, Reguly (2002) questions whether Toronto is becoming the next Montreal, in terms 
of its stock exchange.
1 Similar concerns about liquidity and loss of firms are expressed by Oliver   5
(2002:3), CEO of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada. He points out that “over the last 
two years, 120 Canadian companies have been deleted from the TSX300”. Clearly, the 
discrepancy of opinions relative to the changes of the Canadian stock markets merits an in-depth 
analysis. Finally, the competitive position of the Canadian market recently became a central 
argument in the debate surrounding the modernization of securities regulation in Canada.
2  
In the first part of the paper, we survey the known factors that further, or hinder, the 
development of modern markets, and attempt to determine the significance of these factors within 
Canada. Then, we analyze the competitive position of the Canadian market based on the trading 
patterns of interlisted securities. In the second part, we present and analyze the cross-listing 
phenomenon in Canada. Then, we discuss the results of the tests of our hypotheses. Part three 
presents our concluding remarks.  
1.   Competitive Advantages of Securities Markets 
In a context of intense competition among stock markets and trade globalization, the 
development of stock markets is strongly linked to their capacity to attract foreign stocks and to 
limit foreign trading of domestic stocks. This challenge is particularly formidable in Canada, 
because of the proximity and strength of the U.S. markets. As Eun and Sabherwal (2003:1) note, 
“attracting non-U.S. listing is now a top priority of the U.S. stock exchanges”. According to the 
basic principle of wealth maximization, a company should list abroad when the advantages 
outweigh the costs. The advantages and costs of cross-listing are summarized in the following 
sections.  
1.1.   Advantages and Costs of U.S. Listing for Canadian Firms 
Karolyi (2006) summarizes the main reasons companies list abroad. There are four main 
advantages of cross-listing: 1) market segmentation, whereby cross-listing is a means of 
integrating segmented markets, thus enabling the issuer to access trapped pools of liquidity 
(Coffee, 2002) and reduce the cost of capital; 2) the increase in liquidity and the reduction of 
transaction costs; 3) the bonding hypothesis and 4) strategic considerations. The costs are mainly 
associated with the reconciliation with U.S. GAAP and SEC requirements.    6
Segmentation proposition: when two markets are not integrated, listing abroad can reduce 
the domestic systematic risk, which in turn reduces the company’s cost of capital. Moreover, in 
such situations a company can find pools of liquidity in the host country that are unavailable in 
its country of origin. These pools of liquidity can increase the demand for the stock, and ease the 
issuing of new shares.  
Reduction of transaction costs: Cross-listing is also of interest to traders. According to 
Domowitz et al. (2001), the execution costs are generally lower and liquidity is generally higher 
in the U.S. than in other countries. The authors show (Table 1) that total one-way trading costs 
are 52.4 basis points in Canada and 38.1 points in the U.S. According to this estimation, if a 
portfolio turns over every four months, annual excess costs of 85.8 basis points are incurred if the 
trades are executed in Canada versus the U.S. Such a difference is likely to adversely affect the 
competitive position of the Canadian market.  
Bonding hypothesis: Firms in countries with poor protection of minority shareholders signal 
their desire to respect shareholders’ rights by listing in a jurisdiction with higher scrutiny, tougher 
regulation and better enforcement. As Coffee writes (2002: 11): “cross-listing may also be a 
bonding mechanism by which firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak protection of 
minority rights or poor enforcement mechanisms can voluntarily subject themselves to higher 
disclosure standards and stricter enforcement in order to attract investors who would otherwise be 
reluctant to invest (or who would discount such stocks to reflect the risk of minority 
expropriation).” Moreover, listing in the U.S. can increase coverage by financial analysts. Lang et 
al. (2003) show that securities listed on a market other than their market of origin attract 
increased interest from financial analysts, and are characterized by improved forecast quality and 
higher prices.  
Strategic advantages: To achieve strategic advantages, companies list abroad to get closer 
to their markets for goods and services, to imitate their competitors or to ease acquisitions. 
Bancel and Mittoo (2001) conclude that business-related considerations are the primary reason 
for listing in the U.S. Pagano et al. (2002) assert that firms list abroad to exploit existing product 
market reputation, to access foreign capital markets or – conversely – to support the company’s 
expansion on foreign output markets.   7
These theoretical arguments are generally in line with the opinions of experts and managers. 
Canadian managers purportedly have positive perceptions of the U.S. exchange listings. Houston 
and Jones (2002) focus on the Canadian managers’ perceptions of the benefits and costs 
associated with listing on the U.S. exchanges. The authors confirm that the perceived advantages 
are increased trading volume, following by analysts, name recognition and effects of competition. 
Foerster et al. (1999) conduct interviews with CEOs and CFOs to determine why 45 Canadian 
companies interlisted on a U.S. stock exchange. Of the companies surveyed, 89 per cent believed 
their decision to be sound. The foremost reason for interlisting was increased access to capital. 
Other reasons cited were increased liquidity, institutional investment, analysts’ coverage and 
lower cost of capital. However, stringent disclosure requirements are an impediment to trans-
border listings. The main perceived obstacles to listing in the U.S. are the reconciliation with U.S. 
GAAP disclosure requirements. Several studies have empirically assessed the magnitude of the 
effects of cross-listing.  
1.2.   Global Models 
In addition to the models that explain CEOs’ decision to list their firm abroad, two more general 
propositions are relevant to understand the global effect of inter-market competition: the gravity 
model and the dominant market model.  
Portes and Rey (2005) apply the “gravity” model to cross-border equity flows. The gravity 
model is commonly used to explain trade flows between countries by the two economic masses 
(GDPs) and distance. The authors show that this model also works for immaterial trades in 
equity. The flows mainly depend on various measures of market size (GDP and market 
capitalization). As for goods and services, equity flows are limited by informational frictions, 
mainly caused by the distance between the countries. These variables explain 83% of the 
differences observed between cross-border equity flows. In such a model, Canada and the U.S. 
present maximal size differences (which favors the migration of trades) and minimal distance. 
Accordingly, the flow of equity from Canada toward the U.S. will likely be large, and will grow 
as distances shrink, fuelled by increasing integration of the markets.  
Theoretical models explaining the growth of trading volume in interlisted securities indicate 
the emergence of a dominant market in accordance with the “winner take most” rule (Chowhdry   8
and Nanda, 1991). These models distinguish liquidity traders from informed traders. Liquidity 
traders trade without any specific basis of information and are attracted to markets where trading 
costs are lower and create liquidity. Informed traders base their trading on analysis and 
information. This group primarily comprises institutional investors that maximize their returns by 
trading in the most liquid markets. Accordingly, even if the total trading volume increases when a 
stock is listed on a secondary market, the trading volume in the country of origin may increase or, 
on the contrary, decrease sharply, depending on whether or not the country has a dominant 
market position. The models predict that the transfer of trading will continue to gravitate to the 
country offering the most favorable trading conditions, but, according to Karolyi (2006), why and 
how the order flow gravitates to one market or the other, and how this pattern changes over time, 
is not clear. Baruch et al. (2007) hypothesize and evidence that trading volume is likely to 
migrate to the exchange in which the cross-listed asset returns are most closely correlated with 
returns of other assets traded on that market, a prediction for which they find strong empirical 
support. However, Halling et al. (2006) defend the opposite point of view. They analyze trading 
activity after the cross-listing of European stocks, and bring to light a blip immediately after the 
cross-listing, followed by a trend decline, which in most cases rapidly leads to a virtual 
disappearance of foreign trading activity. This “flow-back” appears to be quite universal in their 
sample, but they observe considerable cross-sectional variation in the persistence and magnitude 
of foreign trading: companies with a large presence in foreign output markets should be more 
heavily traded abroad than other companies, since foreign investors should find it easier to collect 
timely and accurate information about their prospects.  
1.3.   Empirical Evidence 
Numerous studies document the effects of cross-listing in Canada. Karolyi (1998) posits that the 
effects of listing abroad are generally positive. They include: 1) favorable share price reactions to 
cross-border listings in the first month after listing, even if this effect is only observable for 
foreign stocks listing in the U.S., while the price effect of U.S. companies listing in Toronto 
appears to be negligible (p. 18); 2) post-listing trading volume increases on average, and similar 
increases are observed in home-market trading volume; 3) overall improvement in the liquidity of 
share trading and 4) significant reduction of domestic market risk, associated with only a slight 
increase in global market risk and foreign exchange risk, resulting in a net reduction in the cost of   9
equity. This reduction, together with increased growth opportunities and decreased agency costs, 
can explain why foreign companies listed in the U.S. are worth more than non-interlisted firms. 
Karolyi (2006) finds evidence challenging the conventional wisdom that firms benefit from 
cross-listing. However, both empirical results and managers surveys indicate that Canadian 
companies that list in the U.S enjoy several advantages.  
Doidge et al. (2007) evidence that foreign companies that list in the U.S. enjoy a cross-
listing premium (CLP). Cross-listed firms should be worth more because: 1) they can take 
advantage of growth opportunities that they could not have taken advantage of without a listing, 
2) a smaller fraction of the cash flows generated by the firms are appropriated as private benefits 
by insiders and 3) the cost of capital is lower in the U.S.
3 or for cross-listed companies. Canadian 
firms listing in the U.S. exhibit a CLP in the same range as that observed by Doidge et al. for 
firms originating from other countries (King and Segal, 2007). These authors conclude that cross-
listing has a positive impact on valuation over and above the positive effects associated with firm 
size, profitability, cost of equity and past sales growth. However, this increase in valuation 
disappears within two years of cross-listing (King and Segal, 2005). Only cross-listed firms that 
are actively traded in the U.S. market experience a significant increase in valuation over the long 
term. Cross-listed Canadian firms that fail to develop active share turnover in the U.S. and remain 
traded predominantly in Canada are valued no differently from non-cross-listed Canadian firms.  
The positive valuation effect of cross-listing is consistent with the findings of Ammer et al. 
(2005). They show that firms that cross-list experience an economically and statistically 
significant increase in U.S. holdings, equivalent to 8 to 11 percent of the firms’ equity; and that 
cross-listing roughly doubles U.S. investment in a foreign stock. The authors conclude that cross-
listing in the U.S. substantially increases the willingness of U.S. investors to purchase foreign 
equity. These empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that in the U.S., Canadian 
companies can capture pools of liquidity and attract more investors than in Canada. Further, 
exposure to the U.S. market enhances visibility and reputation, thus increasing the attractiveness 
for both Canadian and U.S. investors.  
Cross-listing in the U.S. generally increases liquidity and trading volumes. Foerster and 
Karolyi (1998) document a significant drop in trading costs following the listing of stocks on an 
American market,
4 especially relative to stocks with the highest degree of transfer of trading to   10
the U.S. This decrease is measured on the Canadian market, and shows that the Canadian market 
adjusts to a more competitive environment as soon as stocks are widely traded on a competitive 
market. Trading costs may thus be lower on the American market than on the Canadian market, 
and interlisting may reduce these costs on the Canadian market as well. There is little evidence to 
support this theory, however, as cost measurement is a difficult exercise. Costs depend on 
volume and liquidity, size of trade and stock price. Moreover, as evidenced by Mittoo (2003), the 
positive impact of U.S. listing on both trading volume and trading costs has declined over time. 
The listing abroad announcement is usually preceded by a strong rally, but the post-listing 
performance of newly cross-listed stocks is often assumed to be negative. This effect is generally 
attributed to a decrease in cost of capital or to the timing of cross-listing decisions. Mittoo (2003) 
observes a significant negative abnormal return for new listings of Canadian stocks over the 
1991-1998 period. This result is puzzling, because of the strong integration of the Canadian and 
American markets (Karolyi, 2006). However, Carpentier et al. (2007) replicate this study with a 
more comprehensive sample and various methodologies, and reject the hypothesis of an abnormal 
return following cross-listing of Canadian companies.  
Overall, U.S. listing of Canadian stocks seems to induce positive short-term price effects, a 
positive, albeit temporary valuation effect, an increase in liquidity and a decrease in transaction 
costs. For these reasons, Canadian stock exchanges have faced fierce competition from U.S. 
exchanges in the past decade and have introduced several measures to meet this challenge. The 
MJDS implementation and decimalization were the main responses to this competition between 
the U.S. and Canadian markets during the 1990s. We summarize the main elements of these 
changes and present the prominent studies that analyze these changes in the benefits and costs of 
interlisting, from a Canadian perspective.  
1.4.   Competition Between the U.S. and Canada  
The interlisting of Canadian corporations has been facilitated by the implementation of the 
MJDS, which allows Canadian corporations to list their stocks in the U.S., under less rigorous 
criteria than those that apply to other non-American corporations.
5 The MJDS can be seen as an 
effort by the U.S. to attract Canadian listing. However, it also potentially allows better integration 
of both markets, thus reducing the advantages of cross-listing for Canadian companies. The effect   11
of the MJDS then becomes an empirical question. Houston and Jones (1999) show that the MJDS 
has a very limited effect on the perceived and effective costs of cross-listing, and conclude that it 
has not yielded the benefits originally envisioned (1999: 1).  
In 1995, all Canadian stock exchanges switched from a fractional to a decimal trading 
system. This move was clearly intended to improve the competitiveness of the Canadian stock 
exchanges. Ahn et al. (1998) note that the decline in Canadian market share in the cross-listed 
stocks is one important reason for this change. All markets have a price increment (tick) that 
determines what price the traders use. In the U.S. and Canada, the increment was a fraction based 
on a divisor of 2 (1/2, 1/4, 1/8) while in the majority of stock markets, the tick is a decimal 
fraction (0.01, 0.05).  Decreasing the size of the tick leads to a smaller bid-ask spread, which is an 
important component of transaction costs. Lowering the tick was thus expected to reduce the 
transaction costs, and consequently boost trading volumes.
6 Harris (1997) summarizes six studies 
of the effects of this change on the quality of markets and on the order flows in both countries. 
The conclusions converge on a reduction of spreads on the TSX, and a lower or non-significant 
reduction of spreads on the U.S. markets. No studies report a significant increase in transaction 
volumes, yet some point to a minor decrease. However, as Ahn et al. conclude, order flows do 
not migrate from U.S. markets to the TSX. Chung et al. (1996) report that decimalization does 
not lead to the increased trade activity envisioned by the TSX. They observe, for interlisted 
stocks, little evidence that the decimalization has led to a recapture of trading lost to U.S. 
markets. Harris hypothesizes that decimalization has not significantly affected TSX transaction 
costs, and that investors in Canadian stocks are not price sensitive in the short run.        
In early 2001, the U.S. exchanges decimalized. Oppenheimer and Sabherwal (2003) 
examine the impact of the U.S. decimalization on the trading of cross-listed Canadian stocks. The 
bid-ask spread declined and U.S. trading increased after the change, but not at the expense of the 
TSX volume. The TSX volume for stocks that trade on NASDAQ increased as well. In both 
Canada and the U.S., decimalization does not seem to have had a significant impact on the 
distribution of the transactions between the two countries. Conceivably, the bid-ask spread is 
only one component of the transaction cost, which is why reducing the spread does not 
significantly change the total cost of a trade. According to Cleary et al. (2002), the median total 
cost of (one-way) trading a stock worth more than $20 is 2.3%. The bid-ask component is   12
0.045% after decimalization and 0.055% before. Such a difference can be seen as non-significant 
in the decision to move the location of trades.  
Despite the decrease in the positive effects of cross-listing, probably linked to the growing 
integration of both markets, Canadian managers consider cross-listing to have numerous 
advantages.  The next question, however, is to determine the long-run effect of this attraction on 
the localization of trades and, ultimately, on the activity of both markets. If the perceived 
advantages of listing abroad are mainly strategic, the market structure and the MJDS should have 
a limited impact on the decision to cross-list. However, if the quality of the U.S. market is better 
than that of the Canadian market, then a growing proportion of the trades should be captured by 
the foreign markets, and, ultimately, companies should delist from the TSX. Alternatively, if 
companies list in the U.S. to benefit from market segmentation, gradual integration should induce 
some firms to return to Canada. The changes in cross-listing, the current status of the formerly 
cross-listed companies and the variation in the Canadian proportion of the trades are probably 
among the most significant evidence of the competition between the two markets. It is also worth 
assessing the future of the Canadian market.  
1.5.   Propositions 
Listing in the U.S. presents several advantages for Canadian companies. The gravity model 
predicts that the flow of listing will move from Canada toward the U.S. The liquidity and 
transactions costs of the U.S. market are likely to direct a large proportion of trades toward this 
market. The dominant market proposition indicates that the foreign trading volume will probably 
capture most transactions in Canadian stocks as their exposure to the U.S. market increases. 
To date, researchers have focused on the various consequences of cross-listing on trading 
volume, value and returns. Studies generally rely on the lists of foreign stocks provided by the 
U.S. exchanges, which provides a partial picture of the intense movements of cross-listing and 
cross-delisting of Canadian companies. As an example, while an average of 200 stocks appear to 
be cross-listed at the end of each year, 548 Canadian securities have been listed in the U.S. since 
1990. For these reasons, only partial evidence exists relative to the long-term changes in cross-
listing, trading volumes and cross-delisting. The competitive position of the Canadian stock 
market is largely unknown. We therefore postulate the four following propositions.   13
Proposition 1: A growing number of large Canadian companies are listed in the U.S.  
This proposition follows from the evidence of advantages and costs of cross-listing for Canadian 
companies. Advantages linked to trading costs, liquidity and access to a larger pool of investors 
are probably higher for the larger companies. Conversely, the supplementary regulatory costs, 
induced for example by the SOX regulation, should be proportionally lower for big companies.  
Proposition 2: The U.S. market captures a growing number of formerly cross-listed companies 
Cross-delisting occurs because companies no longer benefit from being listed in one or the other 
market. The gravity proposition, the cost of transaction proposition as well as the strategic 
argument for cross-listing, indicate that cross-listed companies can benefit from more advantages 
by withdrawing their listing in Canada than from retreating to this country. The proportion of 
cross-delisted companies becoming American-traded only should be higher than the proportion 
of firms retreating to Canada 
Proposition 3: The U.S. market captures a growing proportion of the trades of cross-listed 
Canadian companies  
This proposition comes from the observation of lower transaction costs and higher liquidity in the 
U.S., and from the dominant market theory. 
Proposition 4: The competitive position of the Canadian stock market is weakening.  
This proposition follows from the previous observations. According to the gravity concept, 
Canada is in a difficult competitive situation. The difference between sizes with the U.S. is huge 
and the distance is minimal. While attracting foreign listing is of major importance for the 
development of a stock market, the U.S. enjoys a significant advantage over Canada.  
2.   Cross-Listing and Canadian Securities Market 
2.1. Data and Methodology 
Studies of the causes and consequences of cross-listing often rely on second-hand summaries, 
provided by the exchanges at year end. These lists omit several foreign listing, mainly the 
numerous cross-delistings that occur each year, and do not provide information on the trading   14
values in each market. To overcome this problem, we construct our own database of Canadian 
interlisted stocks and trading values, from January 1990 to December 2006. We hand collected 
the required information from the TSX Review, which provides the monthly trading value in the 
domestic and the foreign market, for each cross-listed company. Monthly data are required 
because several securities appear to be cross-listed for just a few months. For each month and 
security of each firm, we collected the volume of transactions in both markets. The population is 
composed of 548 distinct companies, and we determined that 355 firms appear to cross-delist 
during the study period. We determine why these companies cease to be considered as cross-
listed, using the Corporate Survey and Survey of predecessor and defunct company database of 
The Financial Post DataGroup, SEDAR,
7 lists of American O.T.C. markets, Reuters & Dow 
Jones’ FACTIVA  and Internet research tools. To paint the global picture and situate the 
competitive position of Canada, we used the data from the World Federation of Exchanges and 
various editions of the Standard & Poors’ Emerging Stock Market Factbook (subsequently 
renamed Global Stock Markets Factbook). Our methodology rests on analyses of various 
dimensions of the Canadian cross-listing activity and on statistical Chi-square tests.  
2.2.   A Global Perspective 
Table 1 reports the annual number of cross-listed securities and their worldwide transaction 
volume. The number of these securities rose from 143 in 1990 to 244 in 1998.  The decrease 
observed from 1999 to 2003 was offset by a sharp increase in 2004 and 2005. This increase can 
be partially explained by the listing of several Universal Stock Futures (USF)
8. The growth in the 
number of interlisted securities was greater than the growth in the number of companies (55.94% 
vs. 46.21%); indicating that the number of companies that list several categories of securities in 
the U.S. is rising. The worldwide trading value of these stocks also grew considerably: from $69 
billion to $1,683 billion 16 years later. In 2001, the trading value decreased from $1,281 billion 
to $805 billion, mainly because of the loss of value of Nortel Networks and BCE Inc. These 
numbers imply that the interlisted companies are among the largest Canadian companies.   
We also report the number of cross-listed companies and the number of companies that 
enter and quit the interlisted group each year. In Canada, cross-listing is a highly dynamic 
process. In December 1989, 127 companies were listed abroad. From 1990 to 2006, 421 
companies listed their stocks in the U.S.
9 During the same period, 548 Canadian companies were   15
listed abroad, mainly in the U.S. A total of 355 companies ceased to be considered cross-listed, 
for various reasons that we analyze below. The “in and out” movements of Canadian firms from 
the U.S. market are in fact more intensive than indicated by the yearly summaries. On average, 
since 1990, 25 Canadian companies have listed abroad yearly, while 21 disappeared from the 
interlisted companies summary. Some years appear as outliers: in 1999 and 2001, 47 and 50 
Canadian companies lost their interlisted status. The merger wave and the burst of the 
technological bubble are probable explanatory factors of these observations. In 2000 alone, 49 
Canadian companies listed abroad.  
To test the first proposition, we estimate the number and proportion of large interlisted 
Canadian stocks in 1990 and 2006. We limit the analysis to the 60 and 100 largest Canadian 
issuers. In 1990, 18 of the 60 (30%) highly capitalized Canadian stocks were interlisted. The 
proportion is 73% in 2006. A Chi-Square test allows us to reject the hypothesis that these two 
proportions are equal. Similar results were obtained with the 100 largest Canadian stocks. The 
proportion of interlisted stocks in this group increased from 32% to 64%, and these proportions 
differ at the 0.005 level of significance. In analyzing the characteristics of the 16 non-interlisted 
large capitalization stocks within the set of 60, two categories emerged. The first is composed of 
companies where the float is limited despite large capitalization, because much of the control and 
the shares are held by individuals or families; four such stocks are related to the Power 
Corporation of Canada, and two are related to the George Weston Group Limited, of which G. 
Weston controls 62%. The second category contains subsidiaries of foreign groups. We finally 
analyze the proportion of cross-listed amongst the most heavily traded stocks. We use the $1 
billion benchmark (in 2003 $CAN, indexed by the variation in the TSE index). In 1990, 17.48% 
of the most intensively traded Canadian stocks were listed in the U.S. The proportion is 47.98% 
in 2006 and the difference is statistically significant. Accordingly, our first proposition appears to 
be verified. This contradicts Freedman and Engert (2003), who report relatively modest growth of 
interlisted shares. We contend that the proportion of interlisted stocks should be estimated 
relative to the sample of Canadian issuers that can satisfy the U.S. market requirements. We also 
consider that, in a market where the 100 largest companies account for 85% of the market 
capitalization,
10 market trends are closely linked to the cross-listing situation and the location of 
trades’ of these 100 stocks.   16
2.3.   What Became of Canadian Interlisted Companies? 
From 1990 to 2006, 355 Canadian companies ceased to be cross-listed. This trend corroborates 
Karolyi’s (2004) observation that the number of internationally cross-listed stocks declined by 
over 50% from 1997 to 2002. However, this reduction in the number of cross-listed stocks occurs 
during a period when the total number of listed stocks drops significantly in developed markets. 
Between 1998 and 2003, the number of corporations listed on an American stock exchange 
decreased from 12,447 to 9,758, according to data available from the World Federation of 
Exchanges, and the number of companies listed in Canada decreased from 4,431 to 3,630. 
Mergers and delistings can thus explain some of the disappearing cross-listings.  
We carefully analyze each of the Canadian firms that delisted from the U.S. between the 
beginning of 1990 and the end of 2005, to determine why they disappear from this market. We 
were able to determine the reasons in 341 of the 355 reported cases. Table 2 summarizes our 
observations. Several companies disappeared following a bankruptcy or transaction to become 
private. In addition, eight Canadian companies were reorganized into an income trust, and 
NASDAQ does not list trust units.
11 This group of delisted companies is composed of 54 
observations.  
The most common reason that companies lose their interlisted status is mergers or 
acquisitions. We found that 173 companies (49% of the disappearing companies) are acquired or 
merged. We consider that the Canadian companies acquired by a foreign company are absorbed 
by the foreign market. We added to these observations those of the firms that delisted from the 
TSX, yet have kept their listing in the U.S, often following a change in the location of the 
headquarters. 100 companies are thus absorbed during this period. 
Several interlisted companies merged with cross-listed Canadian companies. These 37 
(10%) observations are considered to retain their cross-listed status. This is also the case for 41 
Canadian companies that delist from NASDAQ but are still traded over-the counter (O.T.C.) and 
in Canada. This group of shadow interlisted companies comprises 78 observations. 
The flow-back group consists of 109 companies. The majority of them retreat following an 
acquisition by a Canadian-listed company (63 cases). A sub-sample of 46 companies chooses to   17
delist from the U.S. Their motivations cannot be clarified in each case, but we observe the 
following patterns: 1) the proportion of trades in the U.S. is very low, and probably does not 
justify the burden of U.S. listing. The median proportion of U.S. trades for these 46 stocks is 0.75 
for the month before the delisting from the U.S., and the average transaction volume is low,
12 2) 
the company fails to comply with NASDAQ requirements, 3) some companies sell their 
operations in the U.S. or create a subsidiary in charge of these operations, which becomes listed 
in the U.S. The first observation is consistent with the cost-benefits analysis of a foreign listing. 
When a company fails to attract foreign investors, the costs of the cross-listing outpace the 
potential benefits. This observation is in line with the strategic motive for a foreign listing.  
In essence, the reduction in the number of cross-listed Canadian firms is more perceived 
than real. In December 1989, 127 Canadian companies were interlisted, and 421 listed in the U.S. 
during the 1990-2006 period. Of these 548 companies, approximately 20% (109) retreated to 
Canada, mainly because they were acquired by a Canadian company. We do not observe the 
generalized flow-back phenomenon reported for the European cross-listed securities, and this 
phenomenon seems to be limited to small capitalized firms that fail to attract U.S. investors. The 
U.S. market absorbs a large number of the cross-listed firms, generally by way of a merger or 
acquisition by a U.S.-listed corporation. A few companies delisted from the Canadian market and 
a significant proportion transferred to the O.T.C., because they no longer comply with the listing 
requirements of major exchanges. Going private and bankruptcy account for 13% of the 355 
disappearing companies. While a statistical test cannot be performed due to the nature of the data, 
our observations are consistent with proposition 2, which states that the U.S. markets are 
attractive for Canadian companies. In the last section of this paper, we attempt to analyze the way 
the distribution of trading between the two markets changes over time.  
2.4.   The Attraction of the American Market for Canadian Securities  
We first analyze the changes in the distribution of trades between the two markets, for the 
population of interlisted securities. Then we analyze the changes by size and activity 
characteristics.  
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2.4.1.     The distribution of trades between U.S. and Canada: a global analysis 
Table 3 illustrates the changes in the distribution of the transactions between the two markets, for 
all the interlisted Canadian securities, according to the markets where the trades took place. The 
percentage of trading volume that took place outside Canada increased sharply from 1998 to 
2000, a year in which only 45.9% of trades of interlisted securities occurred in Canada. The TSX 
then appeared to regain ground: in 2003, the Canadian proportion was 59.9%, but the proportion 
decreased sharply again in 2004 and 2005 (46.9% and 49.2%). The 2000 to 2003 variations seem 
to be largely associated with the crash of technology stocks, which were subsequently abandoned 
by American investors. Collectively, three stocks (Nortel, BCE and Corel) triggered a decline in 
trading volume in the U.S. equal to $350 billion.
13 The proportion of interlisted Canadian 
securities traded mainly on foreign exchanges rose from 28% in 1990 (40/143) to 54.71% in 2006 
(122/223). In 1990, interlisted Canadian stocks were mainly securities whose trading value was 
less than $100 million (55.24%). In 2006, the proportion of interlisted Canadian stocks whose 
trading value was less than $100 million decreased sharply to 22.87%. In 2006, 47.98% of the 
interlisted Canadian stocks were securities with trading values higher than $1 billion, as opposed 
to 17.48% in 1990.  
Table 4 presents the results of the tests of the hypothesis that the distribution of trades is the 
same at the beginning and the end of the period. We restrict the sample to the main stock of 
companies interlisted in December 2006. When a company was not cross-listed in 1990, we 
consider that the proportion of Canadian trade is 100%. In 1990, 88.60% of interlisted securities 
were traded primarily in Canada, with more than 80% of trading realized in this country. The 
proportion fell to 16.58% in 2006. Conversely, the proportion of interlisted stocks traded 
predominantly in the U.S. (40% or higher) surged from 4.66% to 66.32% during the same period. 
We can reject the hypothesis that the distribution of interlisted stocks following the split of 
trading between the two markets was the same in 1990 and 2006. On the contrary, the increase in 
the U.S. portion of trade is strong and statistically significant.  
2.4.2.     Detailed analysis of the changes in trading patterns 
The global analysis presented above masks large variations pertaining to securities. Indeed, 
previous research documents significant cross-sectional variation in the volume of transactions   19
following listing in a foreign market (Halling et al., 2006). Moreover, the fact that some 
companies list several securities can distort the results. For each company we select the main 
security traded in the U.S. We then calculate the variation in the proportion of the Canadian 
trades over time. The following rules apply. When the security is traded in January 1990, the 
proportion of Canadian trades is obtained from the TSX Review. This initial proportion is 100% 
when the securities list abroad during the period of analysis. The final proportion is that of 
December 2006, as reported in the Review. This proportion is set to 0 when the company was 
absorbed by the U.S. market, to 100 when it returned to a Canadian listing, and to the proportion 
of the buying company following an acquisition by a cross-listed Canadian company. The 
proportion of Canadian trades is 100% even when the stock is still listed on the OTCBB. 
Companies that failed and went private and trusts are omitted from this stage of the analysis. The 
reported variable, VCP (Variation in Canadian Proportion), is calculated as the ending proportion 
of Canadian trades minus the beginning proportion of Canadian trades. We obtain a null variation 
when the company lists during the period (100% of Canadian trades at beginning) then retreats to 
Canada or is acquired by a Canadian firm. 
In the first column of table 5, we report the distribution of the changes in the Canadian 
proportion of the trades, for the 480 securities. During the period, the proportion of Canadian 
trade increases for 55 of the cross-listed securities (11.46% of the observations). The increase in 
the U.S. proportion of transactions is greater than 80% in 125 cases (26.04% of the observations).  
Overall, we observe a strong trend toward an increase in the trades concluded in the U.S., but the 
changes in the volume of transactions following the cross-listing exhibits strong cross-sectional 
variations. We split the sample by size, estimated by the total volume of transactions (in dollars) 
and by sector, and replicated the analysis. The Canadian gains in the proportion of transactions 
are mainly observed in the small capitalization firms (20%, and 33.13% for the “no change” 
category) while the U.S. gains are realized among the firms that exhibit large or medium 
transaction volumes. The U.S. proportion of trading increased for 81.26% of the securities of the 
high volume group. The distributions of the three groups are statistically significant, according to 
a Chi-square test. Moreover, the hypothesis that the Canadian market retains its proportion of 
trades can be rejected. When the sample is divided by industrial sector, the U.S. market appears 
to capture a growing proportion of the trades in each sector, but the increase in the Canadian 
proportion of trades is more common in the resource sector. The distributions are statistically   20
different and the hypothesis of a gain in the U.S. market relative to the Canadian market can be 
accepted at the 0.005 level of significance.  
These results are in line with proposition 3, which asserts that the proportion of foreign 
trade of Canadian interlisted stocks increases significantly over time. Both the increase in the 
number and proportion of interlisted stocks and the decrease in the Canadian portion of trading of 
these securities are consistent with the hollowing out hypothesis. From a Canadian point of view, 
the decrease in Canadian issuers listed only in the U.S. can be seen as a positive trend. Freedman 
and Engert (2003) illustrate that the number of Canadian issuers listed solely in the U.S. declined 
from 65 in 1995 to approximately 28 in 2002. According to the TSX, the number of Canadian 
firms listed in the U.S. exclusively decreased from 49 in 1997 to 35 in 2001. This decrease is due 
primarily to delistings and mergers (TSX Group Inc. final prospectus, 2002: 18),
1 and cannot be 
associated with a “return home” of these issuers.  
2.4.3.     Foreign issuers on the Canadian stock market 
For a more thorough analysis, we also examined the changes in foreign listings in Canada. The 
value of worldwide trading of interlisted foreign securities increased between 1990 and 1998, 
reflecting the presence of several large-cap securities such as General Motors, Sony and Philips 
Petroleum. The trading value decreased considerably in 1999, mainly because of the withdrawal 
of Mobil Corp and Citicorp from the Canadian market. The number of interlisted foreign 
securities decreased sharply, from 54 in 1990 to 20 in 2006. In 1990, the number of foreign 
interlisted stocks divided by the number of listed Canadian stocks is 4.53% (54/1193), versus a 
proportion of 1.25% (20/1598) in 2006. However, the Canadian volume of trades executed for 
foreign securities listed in Canada is non-significant. In 2006, 20 foreign corporations were listed 
on both a foreign and a Canadian stock exchange, yet only two securities are traded at a rate of 
over 50% in Canada (Aberdeen Asia-Pacific and Solitario Resources). For 7 of the 20 stocks, 
Canadian volume represents less than 1% of total trading volume. The presence of foreign 
corporations on the Canadian market is symbolic—more than 96.5% of the value of trades in 
these securities is generated outside the Canadian market. By comparison, interlisted foreign 
                                                 
1 http://www.sedar.com   21
securities represent approximately 10% of the trading volume on the NYSE (Boisvert and Gaa, 
2002: 23) and more than 900 foreign securities are listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ.  In 2005, 
the Swiss market had 116 listings of foreign securities, London 334, Luxembourg 197 and 
Singapore 122, according to data from the World Federation of Stock Exchanges. Therefore, 
Canadian markets have practically abandoned trading in foreign securities. 
2.4.4.     The global picture 
The consequence of the gravitation of trades to the U.S. market is illustrated in table 6, for 1990 
and 2006. For each of the 13 more active markets in 1990, we report the annual growth rate in 
trade volume, and the volume and rank in 2006. The relative position of the Canadian market is 
deteriorating: it dropped to 11
th place in 2006, from 8
th place 16 years earlier. The Canadian stock 
market has been surpassed by those of Italy, Spain and Korea.  
We estimate the annual growth in trading values for each market. However, comparing 
growth makes sense only for firms of comparable size. In the group of the largest markets (more 
than $US170 billion in 1990) growth is around 20% (the U.S.) or 21.5% (Euronext). Japan lags at 
9%. Among the smaller markets (in 1990) Canada ranks 6 out of 8, very close to Australia (21.8 
vs. 21.1). Canada is thus progressively losing strength relative to other markets. Stock market 
growth is fuelled by internal factors, but may also be triggered by the issue of securities by 
corporations or, on the contrary, may be weakened by the transfer of local securities trading to 
other markets. The loss of relative position of the Canadian stock market is essentially due to the 
transfer to the U.S. of a large part of the trading of cross-listed securities. For example, the TSX 
reports a U.S. trade volume on Canadian interlisted securities of US$719 billion in 2006. If these 
trades had been made in Canada, Canada would have posted the 6
th highest trading volume 
among the markets analyzed rather than the 11
th highest. The loss of a significant and growing 
part of trade to the more advantageous U.S. market is thus the main challenge for the Canadian 
securities market.  
3.   Conclusions and Implications 
This paper illustrates the challenges faced by well established but small stock markets that 
contend with giants like the U.S. markets and NYSE Euronext. Each year, between 20 and 30   22
Canadian companies list abroad for the first time. Of this number, 20% eventually return to 
Canada. The cross-listed companies that retreat to Canada are largely the least capitalized, whose 
stocks fail to attract many U.S. investors. Other firms are absorbed by the U.S. market, by merger 
or by delisting from Canada. Another group disappeared from the records, but is still listed in the 
U.S., outside of the main markets. The attractiveness of the U.S. market is thus omnipresent for 
Canadian firms. We document that the U.S. markets captured a growing proportion of the trades 
in Canadian interlisted companies’ securities, and the Canadian markets lost their portion of trade 
for a large majority of interlisted securities. Around half of the trades were executed outside 
Canada. The proportion of trades of foreign securities conducted in Canada has become non-
significant, and it is difficult to consider these stocks in the Canadian capitalization. Our 
conclusion approximates that of Gaa et al. (2001:31), who maintain that: “the direction of change 
is towards a single global market through the interlinkage of national equity markets. Domestic 
intermediated markets would be undermined by this development, since the standardized 
products traded on those markets could be traded more efficiently and at lower cost on the global 
matching market. The domestic intermediated market would continue to exist, since there will 
always be relatively illiquid products and agents desiring to trade them.”  
Our observations and tests show that the optimistic view of the Canadian securities market 
trends is not borne out by an in-depth analysis of the various indicators of the attractiveness of 
the Canadian market. Our conclusions thus differ from the optimistic opinions of the Canadian 
stock market. The observation of several acquisitions of interlisted companies by foreign firms is 
consistent with the hypothesis that companies list abroad to increase their value and to join 
competitors and markets. Such strategic arguments for cross-listing are not linked to the quality 
of the market, and there is little policy makers can do to limit this effect. Indeed, we have 
probably observed one of the collateral effects of the promotion of international exporting by the 
Canadian and provincial governments. The transfer of large trades to the U.S. is consistent with 
the advantages of listing and trading abroad, and is probably linked to a better (real or perceived) 
quality of the U.S. market. 
Galper (1999) defines three business models for stock exchanges in the 2000s. A global 
exchange (GEX. p. 6) “dominates an economically linked community of several financial 
jurisdictions. It has the largest market capitalization in that community and the greatest trading   23
volume and liquidity of any of its direct competitors. It trades both highly visible international 
securities and derivative products (...). It draws its clientele from a pool of both domestic and 
global investors.” The TSX at least partially meets the criteria of a GEX, but bears a closer 
resemblance to a regional market (p.8), defined as follows: “the Regional Exchange dominates its 
local economy. It has the greatest concentration of regional listings available and is the chief 
expert in these listings. By virtue of its intense national concentration, its index becomes a 
barometer of the health of the publicly quoted part of the regional economy. It may trade 
securities and derivative products. It draws its clientele primarily from regional investors, with a 
smaller share of international investors interested in benefiting from the available expertise and 
opportunities.”   
The TSX Venture Exchange is clearly what Schulman (1999) defines as a Small and 
Medium Business Market (SMB), a category that also encompasses NASDAQ. To the extent that 
Canada has less than 600 corporations capable of being listed and traded on NASDAQ, the TSX 
should also fall in this category. The implications are significant in terms of development 
strategy. According to Schulman (1999: 14), the main element to consider for SMB exchanges is 
location: “an exchange provides a real estate function for companies in the sense that it is where 
companies locate their stock listings and it is where customers (investors) come to buy and sell 
that stock. Therefore, to enhance the profile of an SMB market, exchanges should create 
attractive SMB market communities with financial influence, recognized value, and uniquely 
beneficial services.” Since several large-cap securities are moving to the American stock 
exchanges, it seems inevitable that the Canadian exchange will increasingly become an exchange 
of medium and small businesses, as defined by international standards. 
In terms of public policy, more attention should be devoted to forging strategic alliances.  In 
the Asia Pacific Area, development of financial centers and their stock market component 
appears to be a major concern in several countries. According to Kaufman (2001), this may not 
be an opportune time for emerging economies to allocate public resources to developing an IFC. 
We reinforce this point of view by showing that even well established and full-fledged stock 
markets find it very difficult to maintain their activities, notably the trading of the most liquid and 
capitalized stocks. If Canada is progressively losing market share to the U.S., one can be 
skeptical about the likelihood of smaller and less organized markets’ successfully developing   24
strong and lucrative stock markets. Like Canada, these countries should implement an effective 
mutual recognition system and forge strategic alliances. Moreover, like Canada, Asia Pacific 
countries should study in particular the way small and medium-sized enterprises, which represent 
the largest proportion of their securities market, are listed, regulated and traded. This is probably 
the true challenge markets in smaller countries must face if they wish to survive.    25
 
Table 1.  Annual distribution of Canadian companies listed on both a Canadian stock exchange and 





















1989  - -  127  - - - 
1990 143 68,540 132  12  7  5 
1991 139 59,115 119  8  21  -13 
1992 137 68,019 121  16  14  2 
1993 157  149,760  136  23  8  15 
1994 172  199,014  154  32  14  18 
1995 200  249,886  169  30  15  15 
1996 222  334,304  190  36  15  21 
1997 243  411,477  208  28  10  18 
1998 244  490,663  213  36  31  5 
1999 222  566,331  195  29  47  -18 
2000 237  1,280,983    216  49  28  21 
2001 213  805,399  190  24  50  -26 
2002 194  665,373  177  12  25  -13 
2003 184  704,683  179  17  15  2 
2004  230 1,136,106 186  19  12  7 
2005  252 1,301,894 196  26  16  10 
2006  223 1,682,618 193 24  27  -3 
Total  - -  -  421  355  66 
 
Source: Toronto Stock Exchange Review, January 1990 to December 2006.   26
 
Table 2.  Analysis of the reasons that 355 Canadian companies are cross-listed between 1990 
and 2006, but are no longer cross-listed in December 2006  
 
      
  1990-2006 1990-2006  Code 
 #  %   
Merger or acquisition  173  48.73   
    With or by another Canadian interlisted company  37  10.42  I 
    With or by a foreign company  73  20.56  A 
    With or by a Canadian company  63  17.75  B 
Securities are traded on an American O.T.C. market  41  11.55  I 
Bankruptcy  35  9.86  NL 
Privatization  11  3.10  NL 
Reorganization into an Income Trust  8  2.25  NL 
Delisted from the foreign stock exchange   46  12.96  B 
Delisted from the TSX, but still listed in the US  27  7.61  A 
Information not available  14  3.94   
Total 355  100.00   
Summary by code when information is available        
No longer listed, in either the U.S. or Canada (NL)  54  15.84  NL 
Interlisted, but not on the lists (I)   78  22.87  I 
Absorbed by the foreign market (A)  100  29.33  A 
Back to Canada (B)  109  31.96  B 
 
Sources: TSX review, January 1990 to December 2006, FPinfomart.ca, Sedar, www.otcbb.com, 
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Table 3.  Annual distribution by number and value of Canadian stocks traded in the U.S. and 
geographical breakdown of trades  
 
Securities whose trading value is  Traded elsewhere 
b     %  
< $100  
million 
c 




in %  # < 1%  # > 50%  Traded  
in Canada 
a  Yearly  
#  % #  %         
1990 143 79  55.24 25  17.48  45.3  8  40  54.7 
1991 139 75  53.96 26  18.71  39.6  6  35  60.4 
1992 137 61  44.53 33  24.09  40.2  7  30  59.8 
1993 157 58  36.94 42  26.75  54.1  12  46  45.9 
1994 172 65  37.79 53  30.81  50.7  15  57  49.3 
1995 200 71  35.50 64  32.00  45.3  27  74  54.7 
1996 222 66  29.73 77  34.68  42.2  20  81  57.8 
1997 243 74  30.45 75  30.86  35.4  24  85  64.6 
1998 244 82  33.61 81  33.20  34.8  19  93  65.2 
1999 222 88  39.64 68  30.63  42.1  18  74  57.9 
2000 237 73  30.80 83  35.02  54.1  32  89  45.9 
2001 213 78  36.62 76  35.68  46.7  19  77  53.3 
2002 194 51  26.29 75  38.66  38.8  6  73  61.2 
2003 184 38  20.65 87  47.28  40.1  0  81  59.9 
2004 230 61  26.52 104  45.22  53.1  25  101  46.9 
2005 252 91  36.11 98  38.89  50.8  34  109  49.2 
2006 223 51  22.87 107  47.98  48.4  5  122  51.6 
Source: Toronto Stock Exchange Review, December 1990 to December 2006. 
a We present the percentages of the total value traded on all markets.  
b Certain securities show zero trading value: in 1990, Fahnestock II, in 1994, Currage Inc. and U. 
Dominion, in 1995, Currage Inc., in 1996, STN Inc., in 1997, Trizec Hahn and Moores Retail, and in 
1998 Rea Gold and Tee-Com.  
c We deflate the limits of CAN$100 million and CAN$1,000 million starting on December 31, 2003 
using the Canadian stock market index from DataStream    28
 
Table 4.  Chi-square test of the null hypothesis: the proportion of interlisted Canadian stocks 
traded in Canada is the same in January 1990 as in December 2006. The sample is restricted to 
the main stock of Canadian companies cross-listed in December 2006   
 
  Proportion of trades concluded in Canada 
 %  <20  20<%<40 40<%<60 60<%<80 %>80  Total 
1990            
Number of stocks   1  3  5  13  171  193 
Relative frequency (%)  0.52  1.55  2.59  6.74  88.60  100.00 
2006            
Number of stocks  33  57  38  33  32  193 
Relative frequency (%)  17.1  29.53  19.69  17.10  16.58  100.00 
         Chi- Square  207.92 
Source: Toronto Stock Exchange Review, January 1990 and December 2006. 
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Table 5.  Distribution of the variation in Canadian proportion of trades (VCP) of the main securities of 
Canadian companies listed on both a Canadian stock exchange and a foreign stock exchange (mainly an 
American stock exchange) between 1990 and 2006. Chi-square test of the null hypothesis: the 
proportion of VCP is independent of the volume. Chi-square test of the null hypothesis: the proportion 
of VCP is independent of the industry. 
 
   Total  Volume  Industry 
     low  mean  high  Resource  High  tech  Other 
    #  %  # % # % # % # % # % # % 
VCP  >=  20  32  6.67  24  15.00  5 3.13 3 1.88  24  11.82  2 1.64 6 3.87 
0  <  VCP  <  20  23  4.79  8 5.00 7 4.38 8 5.00  15  7.39 3 2.46 5 3.23 
VCP  =  0  109  22.71  53 33.13 37 23.13 19 11.88 39 19.21 36 29.51 34 21.94 
-20  <=  VCP  <  0  41  8.54 4  2.50 12 7.50 25  15.63 6  2.96 14  11.48  21  13.55 
-40  <=  VCP  <  -20  37  7.71 8  5.00 11 6.88 18  11.25  22  10.84 5  4.10 10 6.45 
-60 <= VCP < -40  49  10.21  11  6.88  18  11.25  20  12.50  27  13.30  9  7.38  13  8.39 
-80 <= VCP < -60  64  13.33  13  8.13  18  11.25  33  20.63  33  16.26  12  9.84  19  12.26 
VCP  <  -80  125  26.04  39 24.38 52 32.50 34 21.25 37 18.23 41 33.61 47 30.32 
Total  480  100  160 100.00 160 100.00 160 100.00 203 100.00 122 100.00 155 100.00
Chi Square         78.95*** 55.79*** 
 
*** Significant at 0.005. VCP is the difference between the proportion of Canadian trades at the end of 2006 (or 
when the security is no longer cross-listed) and the proportion of Canadian trades at the beginning of 1990 (or 
when the security becomes interlisted) in percentage points. VCP = 20 means that the proportion of Canadian 
trades is, for example, 40% in 1990 and 60% in 2006. The volumes have been classified according to the terciles 
of the distribution of the mean total volume of each security over the whole period. Industries have been classified 
based on SIC codes. We used the total sample of the main stock of Canadian interlisted companies (548), except 
for the bankrupt companies (35), companies reorganized under an income trust (8), privatized companies (11) and 
companies for which the information was lacking (14).  
 
Sources: TSX review, January 1990 to December 2006, FPinfomart.ca, Sedar, www.otcbb.com, 
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Table 6.  Ranking of sampled countries and trading volume in US$ billion at the end of 
1990 and 2006  
 1990    2006    Annual   
  
value 
traded   Rank   Value traded  Rank   growth  
U.S : NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX  1,815.5  1  34,199.3  1  20.1% 
Tokyo & Osaka SE  1,531.5  2  6,074.2  3  9.0% 
London SE  543.4  3  7,571.7  2  17.9% 
Deutsche Börse 
a 508.7  4  2,737.2  5  11.1% 
Euronext 
b 171.0  5  3,853.3  4  21.5% 
Korea Exchange   75.6  6  1,342.1  10  19.7% 
Swiss Exchange 
c 69.0  7  1,396.5  8  22.2% 
TSX Group  54.8  8  1,281.8  11  21.8% 
Borsa Italiana  42.2  9  1,581.2  7  25.4% 
BME Spanish Exch.   41.0  10  1,933.8  6  27.2% 
Australian SE  40.2  11  859.6  12  21.1% 
Hong Kong Exch.  34.7  12  832.4  13  22.0% 
OMX 
d 31.13  13  1,332.4  9  26.5% 
   4,958.7 64,995.5     
 
a Data for Germany are not comparable between 1990 and 2006. The method of recording 
volume was changed in 1997 to eliminate partial double-counting of trades (Emerging Market 
Fact Book 2001: 37).  
b We estimate the 1990 trading value for Euronext by summing the values reported by 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris Stock exchanges. 
c Data reported for 1990 are for 1991 since the 1990 data are unavailable. 
d OMX Copenhagen, OMX Helsinki and OMX Stockholm have integrated OMX in 2005; we 
summed the trading values of these three stock exchanges to obtain the reported value for 1990.
 
 
Source: Statistical data available online from the World Federation of Exchange web site 
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Endnotes 
1 As underlined by Zhao (2003) and Laurenceson and Tang (2005), Toronto has overtaken Montreal as a 
financial center. 
2 Recently, a task force was implemented, whose mission was “the modernization of securities legislation 
in Canada and the enhancement of the competitiveness of Canada’s capital markets”. The report’s 
recommendations and research documents of this group are available at http://www.tfmsl.ca/index.htm 
3 This hypothesis can be ruled out for Canadian firms. There is multiple evidence of a great similarity in 
the cost of equity in both countries, at the aggregate level (Hail and Leuz, 2006) and at the industry level 
(He and Kryzanowski, 2007). The second hypothesis, which refers to the bonding effect, seems to reflect 
the fact that CLP is not observed when firms list on the less heavily regulated markets of London, as 
evidenced by Doidge et al. 
4 They measured both the posted bid-ask spread and the effective spread, and took into account the factors 
influencing the spreads, such as the price level, size and trading volume. The effective spread is the 
difference (in absolute value) between the price of the trade and the middle of the range 
5 The MJDS is a joint initiative of the CSA and the SEC. Canadian issuers with market capitalization of at 
least $75 million may use their home disclosure documents rather than undertake the more detailed U.S. 
filing, except in the case of an initial public offering. 
6 Several other effects are expected, mainly in terms of depth of quote, which is the quantity of stocks that 
the dealers are ready to sell (or buy) at the quoted price. We deliberately limit the discussion to the effects 
on transaction costs and volume.    
7 SEDAR is the Canadian equivalent of EDGAR 
8 USF are a global range of standardized futures contracts on the shares of individual companies, traded on 
the Euronext.liffe, regardless of the location of the market of the underlying shares. 22 USF are listed in 
2004. 
9 We consider first cross-listings exclusively. Several companies list on another foreign market following 
their listing in the U.S. We do not analyze these situations. Since the creation of the London Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) in 1995, 44 Canadian companies list on this exchange. We do not consider 
these cases, given that our objective is to assess the Canada-U.S. competition. 
10 See Nicholls (2006) for a detailed description of the Canadian stock markets. 
11 Income Trust rules limit the number of non-resident stockholders. 
12 The median trading value in this category is $674,000 per month. This is lower than the 10
th percentile 
of the distribution of the average monthly trading value for the population ($717,158). The companies in 
this group are thus among the least traded. The explanations of the CEO of FNX mining is a clear 
   32
                                                                                                                                                              
illustration of the cross delisting reasons (SEDAR, May 23, 2006): “FNX Mining listed on AMEX in June 
2003 to increase the Company’s United States retail trading volume and to attract American analyst 
coverage. Neither objective was achieved and our American institutional shareholders continue to trade on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange. In addition, the complexity of securities regulatory compliance in the United 
States and the administrative burdens and increasing costs associated with being a United States reporting 
company have significantly increased in the past few years, particularly in light of new SEC Sarbanes-
Oxley requirements. Overall, these complexities and administrative burdens and their associated costs far 
outweigh any benefits derived from our AMEX listing.” 
13 Nortel represented $508.3 billion of trades in 2000, 65.7% of which took place in the U.S. Trades rose 
to $41.9 billion in 2002, 51.2% of which were in the U.S. BCE dropped from $96.8 billion and 25.5% of 
U.S. trades to $25.5 billion and 12.6%. Corel went from $9.1 billion and 88.5% of U.S. trades to $194 
million and 58.1%.   33
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